Alaksandar Łukašenka has not used his radio and TV spots, likely because he already enjoys a dominant media presence. The other candidates seized the opportunity to air their platforms in this presidential race with a highly predictable outcome.
Broadcasts
On January 9, four pseudo-opponents of Łukašenka appeared on the Belarus 1 TV channel to present their election manifestos.
Siarhiej Syrankoŭ, leader of the Communist Party of Belarus, portrayed himself as a dogmatic Stalinist.
Alaksandar Chižniak, of the Republican Party of Labor and Justice, used only a third of his allotted time.
Hanna Kanapackaja, a former member of the United Civic Party, played the role of an opposition figure.
Aleh Hajdukievič, of the Liberal Democratic Party, expressed support for the regime in a provocative manner.
Syrankoŭ called for censorship, political reprisals (“cleansing the state system and society of ‘werewolves’ in responsible positions”), and a crackdown on LGBT people, warning that “liberalization is the path to Maidan” and the “disasters” that followed the 2014 uprising in Ukraine.
He also spoke of a “crisis of the global capitalist system,” promising to prohibit privatization.
However, some of his statements would not be approved by censors. For example, he lamented the “moral decay of society,” even as government propaganda paints a rosy picture, showing Łukašenka presenting “Spiritual Revival” awards at a recent ceremony.
Candidates’ Promises: safe rhetoric
Chižniak promised to work toward lifting sanctions, but without specifying how. This goal appears to conflict with Łukašenka’s policies, given that he faces sanctions for persecuting opponents, engineering a migrant crisis, his role in a plane hijacking incident and also for supporting the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
To have sanctions lifted, one would need to implement democratic reforms, release political prisoners and pull Belarus out of the military alliance with Russia—steps that contradict the current regime’s course.
It’s clear that those behind Chižniak’s campaign view him as a safe candidate for the system, having approved his cautiously oppositionist stance.
Kanapackaja simply read out her manifesto in both Belarusian and Russian. She promised to alleviate the plight of “those held accountable for events of the previous electoral cycle,” a euphemism for political prisoners.
She presents herself as a moderate opposition figure, vowing to promote the Belarusian language.
Hajdukievič is permitted to voice ideas that do not receive full approval from Łukašenka, such as introducing a mixed-member proportional representation system for parliamentary elections.
However, his main focus is a crackdown on both internal and external opposition. On a campaign leaflet, he is pictured making a sign of contempt towards his opponents.
Kanapackaja sows discord
Kanapackaja, despite pretending to represent the opposition, lashed out at former opposition presidential hopeful Viktar Babaryka on Facebook, calling him “the ideological progenitor of the 2020 tragedy of the Belarusian people.”
Her goal is clearly to discredit the peaceful uprising of 2020 and its leaders, sowing division within the opposition. She employed similar tactics during her presidential campaign four and a half years ago, verbally attacking Babaryka.
Repercussions of 2020
The 2020 protests resulted in thousands of Belarusians being imprisoned, and many more opponents were driven out of the country by repression. Some may regret their participation in the protests, while others feel the timing was wrong.
The peaceful uprising was driven by various factors, including the government’s inadequate response to the COVID-19 pandemic and the brutality of security forces following the presidential election. Public outrage at police violence was certainly a major catalyst.
Public responses, when discontent boils over into widespread protests, cannot simply be postponed for a more “appropriate” time.
Radical programs highlight Łukašenka’s political value
Syrankoŭ proposed the most radical measures, including taxes on wealth, mandatory charity deductions for businesses, the nationalization of healthcare and banks, and a ban on private education.
Such initiatives would undoubtedly face resistance from business owners and their employees. Many will wonder: while Łukašenka dislikes private business owners, under Syrankoŭ, the situation could spiral out of control.
Furthermore, his rhetoric about replacing “ham and prosciutto” with Belarusian analogs and returning to a modest Soviet-era product selection raises concerns that he envisions a return to ration cards and long queues, something that is unlikely to excite voters.
Syrankoŭ also promised to rebuild monuments to Stalin, which could be a dealbreaker for many. After reading his proposals for purges and expropriations, some voters may think: better Łukašenka than a Soviet hardliner under whom the Łukašenka era might seem like a blossoming of democracy.
The phlegmatic Chižniak left the impression of a political nonentity.
The extravagant Hajdukievič, with his fiery anti-Western rhetoric, raises concerns that he would only deepen Belarus’ international isolation. His incendiary threats against adversaries also seem like a potential source of trouble.
Kanapackaja, in her role as the opposition figure, will be used by propaganda to claim that the opposition is small, making up only a symbolic few percent.
She also provides propaganda with an opportunity to argue that a woman is unsuitable for governing the country and cast doubt on Śviatłana Cichanoŭskaja’s victory in 2020.
All the candidates perform their roles so that the main protagonist, Łukašenka, can cast himself in the most favorable light against their backdrop.
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