In December, Śviatłana Cichanoŭskaja finally presented a draft strategy of rebuilding Belarus after Alaksandr Łukašenka’s demise. She and her supporters still have no idea how to overthrow the tyrant.
The strategy outlines four possible scenarios.
Government unlikely to talk to opposition
“Russia is weakened by the war and can no longer provide the same level of economic, military and political support to Belarus,” the first scenario goes.
As a result, social and economic conditions in Belarus deteriorate and Minsk tries to “enter into negotiations with Western countries and democratic forces to have sanctions lifted and relations restored.” A nationwide round table is held to form an interim government of both officials and members of the opposition.
The main question is whether the regime will rush to invite those it scornfully calls “fugitives” to the negotiating table, and would it be ready to share power with them. Western countries make decisions on imposing and lifting sanctions. The Belarusian opposition only indirectly influences these decisions, so Minsk is more likely to bargain with the West only and do as much as possible to avoid democratization.
The communist government in Poland held a round table with the Solidarity trade union in 1989. Solidarity was a powerful force, whereas the regime was shaken by massive strikes.
In Belarus, the screws are so tight that it is impossible to do picketing, let alone a mass strike. The opposition has been driven abroad and is losing touch with the public who, for their turn, are somewhat wary of politics.
Popular uprising hardly possible
The second scenario is based on the assumption that the government in Russia changes after its defeat in Ukraine.
“Russia is exhausted by the war and the sanctions, and it does not care about Belarus,” it says.
Like in the first scenario, social and economic conditions deteriorate sharply, sparking a strike, and protesters clash with security forces. The army remains neutral, the law enforcers are in disarray, while protesters seize the presidential administration and other critical infrastructure facilities, and Alaksandar Łukašenka “is either arrested or flees the country.”
The political environment must turn sharply against the government to make this scenario possible. The fear of reprisals is so chilling at the moment that even if living standards dropped considerably, many people would not dare to take to the streets to confront riot police. Life is absolutely miserable in North Korea, but its people do not rise against the ruler, and Łukašenka’s regime is trying to reach that degree of obedience and submission.
His police are well trained and equipped and many officers have blood on their hands and are sure to face trials if Łukašenka falls. They will fight bitterly for their lives and their families.
What if the army, which was involved in the 2020 crackdown, does not remain neutral? When Łukašenka deployed armored personnel carriers to defend his palace, he showed that he was prepared to shoot, not to flee the country, in contrast to Viktor Yanukovych who fled Ukraine. So the outcome of a hypothetical Belarusian rising is far from obvious.
Who said that a more liberal leadership will replace Putin in the Kremlin? What if a hardliner comes to power and moves to annex Belarus as a consolation prize for the failure in Ukraine?
Łukašenka’s successor might surrender independence to Moscow
In the third scenario, Łukašenka steps down for one reason or another, such as poor health or death, and his successor engages with the West and transforms the system under the burden of inherited problems. Meanwhile, “Russia has been weakened by the war and can no longer use the full range of instruments to influence Belarus.”
What if Łukašenka dies while Russia is still strong enough? What if his pro-Moscow successor decides to get rid of the inherited problems by handing over the remaining sovereignty to the Kremlin?
The fourth scenario says: “The Belarusian army becomes involved directly in the war with Ukraine on the side of Russia and enters the territory of Ukraine. . . . Ukrainian troops enter Belarus with units of Belarusian volunteers in the vanguard,” and the regime’s defeat becomes only a matter of time.
So far the Belarusian ruler has managed to keep his troops at home, and Putin has not really pressured him to enter the war. On the contrary, Moscow is more generous than ever, which means that the Russian president is satisfied with Łukašenka’s services.
What if Łukašenka joins the Russian war when Kyiv is on the verge of defeat and unable to counterattack, and the two allies achieve their goals?
Opposition has little influence on factors of change
I am deliberately picking on the scenarios to emphasize that all of them are too smooth and based on optimistic assumptions. Who knows, maybe one of them will materialize, but it might be better to consider likely contingencies.
All the scenarios are based on the assumption that Russia would be exhausted by the war, would be defeated and would not care about Belarus.
But let us face it, many are already wondering whether Ukraine will hold out. A window of opportunity, as the strategy sees it, may never open for Belarus.
All these scenarios are based on external players, such as the Ukrainian army or the devastating effect of Western sanctions.
The opposition can influence these factors only to a limited extent. Of course, it will not provide Ukraine with Storm Shadow and Patriot missiles and F-16 fighter jets. Western countries impose sanctions based on their own considerations, and passionate appeals by Belarusian opposition leaders do not play a key role in decision-making. It is also obvious that the West is unable to impose devastating sanctions.
The Kalinoŭski regiment has set up a working group to draft a strategy for liberating Belarus using the force of arms.
The regiment cannot jump over the belt. Although it consists of Belarusian volunteers, it is still a part of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and Kyiv has no intention to fight against Łukašenka, unless he strikes first.
The Kremlin’s pillar of the Belarusian regime may indeed crack. But when?
Cichanoŭskaja’s team should have rolled out the strategy at the “New Belarus 2023” conference in August, but it was not ready at the time.
At the moment, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Łukašenka are confident, although they have no reason to rejoice. The Russian economy has withstood the impact of sanctions. The Belarusian economy is dependent on it, so it has survived as well.
Russian troops have launched a counteroffensive in Ukraine, while the West is showing signs of fatigue in supporting Kyiv. Moreover, some Western politicians are said to be reluctant to see the Kremlin suffer a major defeat, fearing Russia’s disintegration and nuclear proliferation.
The world is witnessing a dramatic confrontation between autocracies and democracies. The scenarios of the Belarusian opposition assume that Russia will not care about Belarus at some point, but let us be honest: it is the West that cares little about Belarus at the moment.
On the one hand, the Belarusian opposition is trying to keep the Belarusian issue in the limelight and, on the other hand, it is struggles to win over Belarusians.
To avoid being pushed to the margins of politics, opposition leaders should make sober judgments. Hopefully, they can find the resources for self-preservation to be able to fulfill their mission at a right time.
The mole of history burrows his way forward. Łukašenka has tightened his grip. As long as the Kremlin supports him, he seems impregnable, so the triumph of darkness and evil can continue for a while.
Sooner or later, Russia will surely follow in the footsteps of other empires. Putin’s challenge to the West is risky, it condemns Russia to degradation, and in the long run it is disastrous for the Kremlin.
The empire must die. Importantly, the anti-imperial narrative has now become an axiom for Cichanoŭskaja and her team.