Belarus’ interior minister indicated on January 11 that no political prisoners will be pardoned in this year’s amnesty program, but two days later he said that some of those convicted of extremism-related crimes might be eligible on condition they have repented.
Interior minister voices Łukašenka’s opinion
It is not known whether Alaksandar Łukašenka said anything about political prisoners during the January 11 government conference.
Interior Minister Ivan Kubrakoŭ said after the meeting, “We proposed that extremists and terrorists who have been convicted and held criminally responsible should not be granted amnesty. Our proposal was supported.”
Two days later, he said, however, that the Belarusian leader had suggested amnesty, on a case-by-case basis, for those convicted of extremism-related crimes on condition that “the person has repented.” “The matter has yet to be finalized,” he added.
Officials never use the term “political prisoners.” They argue that those widely regarded as political prisoners are just ordinary criminals. The government is brutally avenging its humiliation in 2020, convicting regime opponents of alleged extremism and terrorism, while actually punishing them for their political views.
The incumbent refuses to show any mercy for his critics. Nor is he willing to compromise or negotiate with the West. He has turned a deaf ear to appeals for clemency from exiled opposition leaders.
Łukašenka used to be more flexible
Political prisoners have always been part of Minsk’s game with the West. Łukašenka released dissidents to unfreeze ties with the West or out of economic interest, when he profited from fuel shipments to Europe. He also did it to counterbalance Moscow’s influence.
In August 2008, Łukašenka pardoned the most prominent political prisoner, ex-presidential candidate Alaksandar Kazulin, who had been sentenced to five and a half years after the 2006 election.
The regime, which was actually less ruthless then, freed all political prisoners in 2008 amid an energy price dispute with Moscow and Russia’s attack on Georgia, which must have freaked Łukašenka out. He did not recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states.
Back then, the Belarusian leader could sometimes afford to resist Moscow. For example, in 2009, at the height of a “milk war” with Russia, he refused to attend a key security summit, forcing Russia to delay the signing of an agreement on the Collective Rapid Reaction Force.
Time and again, he defiantly frustrated Moscow in its effort to absorb its neighbor, and the Russian media speculated whether the two-faced ally would eventually turn his back on Russia.
Meanwhile, the West held out hope that it could re-educate the dictator and find common ground. In November 2010, in the run-up to the presidential election, the foreign ministers of Germany and Poland, Guido Westerwelle and Radoslaw Sikorski (who recently returned to the post), met with Łukašenka in Minsk. Sikorski said then that Belarus could count on 3 billion euros if it held a fair election.
But Łukašenka brutally suppressed the December 19 post-election rally, jailing several dozen opposition figures. Several months later, however, he pardoned almost all of them in an effort to reconcile with the European Union and the United States. Opposition leader Mikola Statkievič was the last to be pardoned in August 2015.
At the time, Łukašenka was concerned about the annexation of Crimea by Russia and was preparing for the next presidential election scheduled for October 2015.
Belarus enjoyed a political thaw for a few years after 2015. The government allowed a “soft Belarusization” and even let opponents to stage a big show in downtown Minsk in 2018 to celebrate the 100th anniversary of the Belarusian National Republic.
In 2019, Łukašenka rejected integration roadmaps proposed by Moscow. In early 2020, in the midst of another oil price dispute with Russia, he met with US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in Minsk and tentatively agreed to buy oil from the US.
2020: turning point
Those days are long gone. 2020 marked a new phase of repression. Unprecedented protests have ended in a crackdown. Łukašenka has taken thousands of political prisoners and become involved in Russia’s war against Ukraine.
In last three years, he has escalated the tension to a point where dialogue with the West seems impossible.
He would not release any political prisoners because he was deeply scarred by the 2020 protests and is fearing a new popular uprising, some observers say. Others argue that he has cemented his grip, so that releasing a few political prisoners would not make a difference for the system’s stability.
Most likely, Łukašenka is unwilling to compromise out of principle. He has bet on brutal force and boundless cruelty against those who dared to encroach on his sacred power. He wants everyone to tremble with fear.
The ruler has already made it clear that he intends to run again in 2025, and if his health permits, he may try to stay on until his favorite son Mikałaj grows up. Since he cannot count on popular support, he hopes to rule the country with an iron fist in the atmosphere of total fear.
Western politicians do not believe in Lukashenka’s political independence and negotiability. Most of them see him as an extremely toxic figure to deal with and a puppet of Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Therefore, Sikorski, Poland’s new foreign minister, is unlikely to offer the dictator €3 billion again. He has recently called opposition leader Śviatłana Cichanoŭskaja the president of Belarus.
Opposition’s limited leverage
Cichanoŭskaja last week visited Warsaw, reiterating her commitment to do whatever possible to free political prisoners.
Last year, pro-democracy forces developed a strategy to that effect, while the opposition Coordination Council proposed a comprehensive approach, from sanctions to compromises.
However, Łukašenka refuses to deal with the opposition as long as he is in a strong position. Together with Putin he has learnt to circumvent the sanctions, while Ukraine’s offensive fell short of expectations, and the West may cut its support for Kyiv.
As for new sanctions, the EU fears that tightening would have an adverse effect on European countries, hurting businesses and voters.
Washington is also carefully rationing restrictions, playing its own complex global game, primarily with Russia and China.
Could the West ease sanctions in return for the release of political prisoners? Most restrictions were imposed for the forced landing of a Ryanair plane, Łukašenka’s role in orchestrating the migration crisis at the EU border and his complicity in the Russian aggression against Ukraine.
Minsk has not indicated readiness to cooperate on migration, and there is no way Łukašenka can get away with complicity in the war against Ukraine.
Backdoor diplomacy can certainly bring some success in individual cases.
In 2020, Pompeo phoned Łukašenka to arrange for the release of Vital Šklaraŭ, a US citizen. There were other successful cases of negotiation too.
In the foreseeable future, the government might be expected to free only those who are dying in prison.
Minsk might also release Andrzej Poczobut to defuse tension with Warsaw and prevent the complete closure of the Polish border.
But in general, the release of political prisoners hinges on political and economic reforms. The regimes of Putin and Łukašenka may not be as resilient as they look. The war in Ukraine may still take many twists and turns, and sanctions are slowly eroding both autocracies.
At the same time, waiting until the dungeons fall is not an option. The opposition should fight for every chance to save at least some of those rotting in prisons.