Boris Nadezhdin’s anti-war stance fuels enthusiasm in the West about the Russian presidential election. Some observers see him as Russia’s hope for change, and even dubbed him “Russia’s Śviatłana Cichanoŭskaja.”
However, public discontent with Vladimir Putin is unlikely to reach a breaking point and boil over into a wave of protests similar to what Belarus experienced in 2020.
For the proponents of change in Belarus, the Russian presidential election will hardly be a window of opportunity. The emergence of a liberal hopeful like Nadezhdin seems even more unlikely in the harsh Belarusian dictatorship.
A principal opponent of Putin
Nadezhdin’s popularity skyrocketed in January amid anxiety about Russia’s war against Ukraine. Previously known only to connoisseurs of Russian political cuisine and regular viewers of propaganda talk shows, he has become a world famous politician.
Until recently, analysts in the West viewed the Russian presidential election as a boring show with a bad ending. Now some observers associate Nadezhdin with hope for change.
Western analysts and many of his supporters in Russia are well aware that he is part of Putin’s system and that he will stay within the lines it drawn for him. His pro-peace rhetoric and criticism of the government are extremely cautious and generally half-hearted.
Putin’s opponents pin their hopes not so much on Nadezhdin, but on the situation eventually spiraling out of the Kremlin’s control and Russia following in the footsteps of Belarus in 2020.
Opposition activists urging Russians to vote for Nadezhdin are not expecting him to win, but hope that his campaign will galvanize Putin’s opponents.
Western intelligence agencies, however, have no illusions. Bruno Kahl, chief of the German Foreign Intelligence Service (BND), said that Putin’s position is strong and there is no reason to hope for change in Russia. Nevertheless, even some Belarusian observers talk about Nadezhdin with hope.
Russian liberals despise Łukašenka
Nadezhdin, a 60-year-old physicist and lawyer, has been in politics since the early 1990s and has participated in all election campaigns in one way or another.
In 1999, he was elected to the State Duma from the Union of Right Forces and has long been a member of the close circle of Russian liberal politicians Boris Nemtsov and Sergei Kirienko.
(Boris Nemtsov (left) and Nadezhdin (right)
Nemtsov, an outspoken critic of Putin, was assassinated in Moscow in 2015, while Kirienko has made a successful career and is now in charge of the presidential administration’s domestic policy. Nadezhdin is claimed to be his protégé.
Although Belarus is of secondary importance to Nadezhdin, he spoke about the neighboring country at Russian propaganda talk shows.
On March 27, 2023, speaking on an NTV show, Nadezhdin slammed Putin’s decision to send Russian tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus, arguing that Alaksandar Łukašenka is an unreliable man with a dubious reputation. In the event of a crisis or unrest in Russia, the Belarusian autocrat “will be the first to run away with our nuclear weapons and surrender to NATO,” he said.
Nadezhdin mocked Łukašenka in another televised statement, making it crystal clear that he considers him an ungrateful parasite who lives at Russia’s expense.
That point of view is typical of the Russian and, first of all, Moscow liberal intellectuals who once rallied round the Union of Right Forces. Such views have been widespread in these circles since the late 1990s.
They were particularly characteristic of Nemtsov, a deputy prime minister in the governments of Viktor Chernomyrdin and Sergei Kirienko. Nemtsov seemed to harbor a deep personal grudge against Łukašenka and never hesitated to ridicule him.
Nadezhdin is no stranger to imperialism, and there is no doubt that he sees Belarus as a Russian sphere of influence.
Nadezhdin vs Cichanoŭskaja
Cichanoŭskaja’s story is a political thriller. At 37, she entered politics by accident and might have defeated Łukašenka.
The Kremlin, apparently after analyzing Łukašenka’s errors, disqualified Yekaterina Duntsova, a 40-year-old journalist and a former city councilor, without even allowing her to collect signatures. A new figure in Russia’s big politics, she is more like Cichanoŭskaja in 2020.
Source: nadezhdin2024.ru
Unlike Duntsova, Nadezhdin is part of the Russian political establishment. As a participant in propaganda talk shows, he took part in brainwashing Russians.
Until recently, he gave the Kremlin no reason to doubt his manageability and, above all, his willingness to play by its rules.
Still, Russian media reported that the Kremlin is apparently unhappy with his pointed remarks and popularity.
Belarusian propagandists consider him a liberal boor
Minsk’s heavy reliance on Moscow prompts many Belarusians to follow Russian politics. Many still live in the Russian information space. Faced with deeply entrenched dictatorship and reprisals in Belarus, opponents of the government pin their hopes on outside forces. Nadezhdin’s verbal attacks on Łukašenka may find a receptive audience in Belarus.
The Belarusian ruler has not yet publicly indicated what he feels about Nadezhdin. He might associate him with liberals in the Russian government during the late rule of Boris Yeltsin and early rule of Putin.
The outright vilification of Nadezhdin by Belarusian state propaganda speaks for itself and is a response to his strong-worded remarks about Łukašenka.
Minsk’s propagandists have warned the Russians against a repeat of Belarusian protests of 2020. Propaganda officers described Nadezhdin as a “traitor,” “a tool in the hands of the insidious West” and “a boor in liberal disguise,” as top Belarusian propagandist Vadzim Hihin called him on a Russian talk show.
2025 election: Minsk will not let genie out of the bottle
Nadezhdin casts himself as a liberal statesman who constructively criticizes the current Russian government and intends to defend national (imperial) interests if he wins. He is a product of the Russian political system, which tolerates “constructive opposition” and even welcomes its participation in elections.
Minsk used similar tactics, when Taćciana Karatkievič was allowed to run in the presidential race in 2015 and Hanna Kanapackaja, in 2020.
However, the Belarusian government is unlikely to register any opponents for the 2025 race for fear of political unrest. Nadezhdin’s campaign may increase his political weight, but is unlikely to change the situation in Russia and beyond. For Belarus, the Russian election is of secondary importance. Minsk will do its best to prevent any critics from running.