Zianon Paźniak, an influential and controversial figure in Belarusian politics, turned 80 on April 24. Among pro-democracy activists, many criticize him as a dogmatic and schismatic man difficult to deal with, and someone who sees KGB agents everywhere.
Paźniak at a Freedom Day rally in Warsaw on March 25, 2023
Paźniak’s heyday was in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when he was actively involved in the formation and leadership of the Belarusian Popular Front (BPF).
Early 1990s
The BPF was founded by nationalists who tried to use the window of opportunity opened by perestroika to break away from Moscow.
During the collapse of the Soviet empire and in early years of independence nationalists achieved a lot.
The BPF enlightened compatriots and helped them identify themselves as Belarusians and not as the “Soviet people.”
However, the number of people who embraced nationalism did not reach a critical mass at the time. As a result, Belarus, unlike the Baltic countries, was never able to spin itself out of Moscow’s orbit. Moreover, today its dependence on Russia has become disastrous.
After the 1990 election, a group of BPF activists led by Paźniak formed a small parliamentary faction and rocked the boat of the conservative majority. In parliamentary debate, Paźniak showed his charisma, oratorical talent and team leadership skills.
The BPF capitalized on the defeat of the 1991 coup in Russia. At the famous “Independence Session” in August, the opposition, brilliantly exploiting the hardliners’ insecurities, succeeded in pushing the declaration of Belarus’ state sovereignty through the parliament.
In September 1991, at the suggestion of BPF MPs, the historical white-red-white flag and Pahonia emblem were declared the state symbols instead of the Soviet ones.
Paźniak speaking at the square in front of the Government House in Minsk during a break in the "Independence Session" on August 25, 1991
In 1994, Alaksandar Łukašenka took his first presidential oath at an inauguration platform decorated with these symbols.
He would soon introduce Soviet-style symbols, start cozying up to the Kremlin and crack down on the BPF and its leader.
Defeat and emigration
The rise of Łukašenka, a farm director with pro-Moscow views, was a turning point in Belarus’ history.
The nationalists lost that decisive battle. In the first round of the 1994 presidential election, pro-democracy votes went to Paźniak (12.8 percent) and Stanisłaŭ Šuškievič (9.9 percent). They received far fewer votes than Łukašenka (44.8 percent).
Thus, even nationalists’ unification would not have prevented Łukašenka, who skillfully exploited ordinary people’s nostalgia for the Soviet past, from winning.
In the early 1990s, the BPF lacked flexibility and responsiveness to public sentiment. Paźniak and his team were too categorical in articulating their plans for Belarusization and anti-imperial slogans.
Their political opponents took advantage of it, portraying the BPF as extremists, fanatics and fascists, claiming that they would hang their opponents from lampposts for not speaking Belarusian if they came to power.
However, it was not the BPF that blundered its mission. It was unable to succeed because of the underwhelming sense of national identity among that generation of Belarusians.
During the economic decline, the standard of living plummeted. Łukašenka promised to deal with the state mafia and reopen the factories.
The Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians experienced the same hardships, even greater ones, because of Moscow’s economic blockade. However, their citizens firmly chose the path to democracy, a free market and eventually European Union membership.
Meanwhile, the majority of Belarusians had the illusion that a return to the Soviet Union would bring back stability and relative prosperity.
In 1996, Paźniak was forced into political exile. After a split within the BPF, he led the Conservative Christian Party, a marginal group that slipped into sectarianism and spent the rest of its gunpowder mostly on finding enemies among government opponents
Many looked down at Paźniak as a downed pilot, but after the crackdown on the peaceful revolution of 2020, thousands of opponents found themselves in his shoes as political émigrés with little ability to influence politics in their home country.
Help to Ukraine
After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Paźniak tried to forge an alliance with the Kastuś Kalinoŭski Regiment (KKR).
At the beginning of 2023, as leader of the Free Belarus Movement, he posed for pictures wearing a bulletproof vest on the front line in Bakhmut.
Paźniak (center) in Bakhmut on January 29, 2023
After the visit, the Free Belarus Movement said it would team up with other opposition groups and the KKR to set up a security council. But something did not work out.
Last year’s proposal by Paźniak that Łukašenka and Volodymir Zelensky exchange Russian POWs with Belarusian passports for Belarusian political prisoners did not get traction either.
Overall, Paźniak has been politically active. He participates in diaspora activities, speaks at rallies and gives lectures.
Russian imperialism
Paźniak has many enemies, not only in the government but also in the opposition. He makes new enemies himself, generously labeling people as Moscow’s agents.
Perhaps, he is not always wrong. When access to the KGB archives opens in a future democratic Belarus, we should expect a lot of sensations.
But since it is impossible to access its databases now, finger-pointing is useless and counterproductive.
Some think that Paźniak is just as authoritarian and intolerant man as Łukašenka.
By the way, the ruler, who usually denigrates the opposition, spoke with certain respect about Paźniak on several occasions.
But most often Łukašenka repeats the same old story that the nationalists, who were allegedly in power in the first years of Belarus’ independence, made the Russians pack their bags. Łukašenka sought to please Moscow with this story.
Paźniak, on the other hand, has never tried to please the Kremlin. He made an accurate diagnosis of Russian imperialism in his article “On Russian Imperialism and its Danger” published in the parliamentary daily Narodnaya Gazeta in January 1994.
The article, in which he described his nation with its pro-Russian sentiment as “deeply and seriously ill,” might have only undermined his chances in the run-up to the first presidential election.
A passionate fighter against the empire, he could not remain silent. And years later, many realized that he had a point.
Set to go down in history
Some think that Paźniak’s harsh criticism of Śviatłana Cichanoŭskaja and her team is just sowing discord among pro-democracy forces.
Cichanoŭskaja’s team, which initially had no clear ideological platform, is gradually drifting toward Belarusian nationalism and anti-imperialist positions.
Many critics question Paźniak’s efficiency as a politician. But, on the other hand, who in the Belarusian opposition is efficient in the current situation?
Paźniak has already gone down in history as a nationalist heavyweight, and a hundred years from now students will read about him in textbooks. What he did for Belarus deserves deep respect.
When a window of opportunity opens, new charismatic leaders will crop up. Times will change, and new bright personalities will surely carry on the struggle for Belarus, to which Paźniak, a living legend of national renaissance, dedicated his life.